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POST-CONTRACTUAL ARBITRABILITY AFTER NOLDE
BROTHERS: A PROBLEM OF CONCEPTUAL CLARITY
ARTHUR S. LEONARD*
INTRODUCTION
In Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery
Workers Union,' the Supreme Court held that a labor-management
grievance dispute which arose after the expiration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement might, under certain circumstances, be compulsorily
arbitrable even though no successor agreement providing for arbitra-
tion had been entered into by the parties.2 In so holding, however, the
Supreme Court was imprecise in articulating the factors underlying its
determination,3 leaving to the lower courts and the National Labor Re-
lations Board (Board) the considerable task of adopting the broadly
phrased Nolde rationale-a presumption of continuing arbi-
trability-to differing situations where the issue of post-contractual
arbitrability might be crucial. In the years since Nolde was decided, a
body of inconsistent case law has emerged, sending confusing signals to
employers and unions with respect to their mutual obligations to arbi-
trate grievances upon the termination of a labor contract.
*Associate Professor, New York Law School; B.S. 1974, Cornell University; J.D. 1977,
Harvard Law School.
1. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
2. Id. at 250-55.
3. Published commentaries on the Nolde decision are united in faulting the Court for
its poor articulation of the reasoning underlying its holding. See Goetz, Arbitration After
Termination of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 63 VA. L. REV. 693, 701 (1977); Case
Comment, Nolde and Arbitration of Post-Contract Disputes, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 187
(1979); Recent Decision, Labor Law-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Arbitration
Required After Expiration of Contract, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 1142, 1144 (1977).
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I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
Executory agreements to arbitrate union-management grievance
disputes, not enforceable under common law,4 were made enforceable
as a matter of federal law with the enactment of section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.1 In Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills," the Supreme Court held that the applicable law in
determining questions of contract enforcement in section 301 actions
was federal law, as developed primarily from the policies emanating
from federal labor statutes and secondarily from not inconsistent state
contract law principles.7 In the Steelworkers Trilogy,8 the Court con-
tinued to develop this substantive federal law to govern labor agree-
ment enforcement actions by setting forth certain principles which
would govern in cases involving the interpretation of grievance arbitra-
tion provisions.9 Foremost of these basic principles was that "arbitra-
tion is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."'1
Soon after the Steelworkers Trilogy, in John Wiley & Sons v. Liv-
ingston,"" the Court had to decide whether the duty to arbitrate a dis-
pute which arose during the term of the contract could be enforced
after the contract had expired. 12 In Wiley, the union filed suit in fed-
eral district court to compel arbitration one week before the expiration
of its contract.1 3 By the time the suit was before the court for decision,
the contract had expired and the relationship between the union and
the contracting employer had terminated.1 4 The employer had argued
that the duty to arbitrate over the dispute had expired with the con-
tract.' 5 The Court disagreed, stating that as long as the dispute had
occurred prior to the expiration of the contract, the duty to arbitrate
4. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
6. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
7. Id. at 456-57.
8. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
9. In American Mfg., for example, the Court held that in interpreting and enforcing a
collective bargaining agreement, a court's function is confined to ascertaining whether
the party has made a claim which on its face is governed by the agreement, i.e., an
arbitrable dispute. 363 U.S. at 567-68.
10. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.
11. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
12. Id. at 554-55. One of the major issues in Wiley was the question of whether the
duty to arbitrate the dispute extended to a successor employer. Id. at 554.
13. Id. at 546.
14. Id. at 551.
15. Id. at 554.
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had attached to that dispute.'6 Consequently, the later expiration of
the contract had no effect upon the employer's duty to arbitrate.
17
In a case that came up shortly after Wiley, Piano & Musical In-
strument Workers v. W.W. Kimball Co.,' 8 the Court summarily re-
versed a Seventh Circuit ruling which had denied the existence of arbi-
trability with respect to a dispute which arguably began after contract
expiration. 19 The Seventh Circuit had distinguished Wiley on factual
grounds.20 The Court's per curiam reversal merely cited Wiley with no
explanation,2 leaving open the question of whether the time when a
dispute arises is the determinative factor with respect to questions of
arbitrability. The conclusion that it is not was apparently reached by
the Court in Nolde.
22
II. THE NOLDE DECISION
On March 7, 1977, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Work-
ers Union,23 affirming a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
which the court required an employer to arbitrate a union's post-con-
tractual grievance with respect to the right of laid-off employees to re-
ceive severance pay under an expired collective bargaining agree-
ment.24 The employer had announced its decision to close its plant
only a few days after the contract had expired and while faced with a
strike threat by the union.25 The employer had refused severance pay
16. Id. at 555.
17. Id. at 554-55.
18. 379 U.S. 357 (1964).
19. 333 F.2d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 1964).
20. 333 F.2d at 763-65. Kimball, like Wiley, presented the issue of whether the duty
to arbitrate continued after termination of the collective bargaining agreement, and the
court's distinction was premised on factual differences between the cases. Id. Among the
differences cited by the Kimball court was that in Wiley the merger took place between
two companies located in the same city which would not cause a difficult transfer of
employees, whereas in Kimball a transfer would be from Chicago to Indiana and would
be "drastic, if not difficult." Id. at 764. Also, none of the employees in Kimball indicated
a desire to transfer to the acquiring company. Id. at 765. When the dispute arose in
Kimball and the Union offered to submit disputed issues to arbitration the contract had
already expired. Id. at 762-63. Stating that the lay-offs at issue were "strictly in accor-
dance with the provisions" of the collective bargaining agreement, the Kimball court
held that because there was no difference between the parties regarding seniority rights
during the term of the agreement, "there was no difference which became a proper sub-
ject for arbitration." Id. at 765.
21. 379 U.S. at 357 (1964).
22. 430 U.S. at 250-52.
23. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
24. 530 F.2d 548, 553 (4th Cir. 1975).
25. 430 U.S. at 247. The contract expired on July 21, 1973 and the petitioner's plant
closed on August 31, 1973. The Union asserted its claims soon after the plant closing. Id.
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to the employees who were laid off as a result of the plant closing,20
claiming that their right to severance pay had expired with the con-
tract.2 7 When the union demanded that the employer arbitrate its duty
to pay severance,2 8 the employer refused, asserting that any require-
ment to arbitrate the dispute had also been extinguished by the expi-
ration of the contract.
2
The union filed an action in federal district court under section
301 of the Act, seeking to compel arbitration.3 0 The district court held
that severance pay was a creation of the contract and, as the contract
had expired prior to the lay-offs, the company was under no obligation
to pay it. s1 Having thus resolved the dispute on its merits, the court
found it unnecessary to decide whether the right to arbitrate survived
the contract expiration.3 2 The court, however, noted that the duty to
arbitrate is also a creation of the contract, and stated, citing no inde-
pendent authority for this proposition, that because the dispute arose
after the contract had expired, the company had no obligation to
arbitrate.33
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had
incorrectly dealt first with the substantive issue rather than the ques-
tion of arbitrability.3 ' Dealing briefly with the substantive issue, the
court stated that the district court had incorrectly concluded that sev-
erance pay by its nature cannot be "accrued" under an expired con-
tract.30 Rather, stated the court, the right to severance pay, whether
"accrued" or not, must be determined by an interpretation of the per-
tinent collective bargaining agreement language, and that interpreta-
tion is properly the function of an arbitrator.3 0 Dealing next with the





30. Local No. 358, Bakery and Confectionery Workers Int'l Union v. Nolde Bros.,
Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (E.D. Va. 1974).
31. Id. at 1357-58.
32. Id. at 1358-59.
33. Id. at 1359. It is noteworthy that the court failed to refer to either Wiley or Kim-
ball in this part of its discussion.
34. 530 F.2d at 550. The court stated that:
[T]he district court approached the issues backwards when it first determined
whether the company's obligation for severance pay survived the contract. This
is a question more suitable for arbitration than judicial decision, as we explain
below. Thus, the first question for the district court was whether the company's
duty to arbitrate this particular issue survived the expiration of the contract.
Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 550-51.
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Court had undercut the notion that arbitration could only be com-
pelled under an existing, effective contract, most notably in Wiley.37
Prior to Nolde, some courts had held that only disputes arising during
a contract term remained arbitrable after the contract ex-
pired-holdings which may have been based on a narrow construction
of Wiley.3 8 The Nolde circuit court, seizing on broad language in Wi-
ley, held that Wiley extended further.39 If there was a dispute about
the continued existence of rights alleged to exist under an expired con-
tract, that dispute was arbitrable, even though the dispute itself did
not arise until after the contract had expired, because the parties had
contractually agreed to submit disputes about their rights under the
contract to arbitration. 40 The Nolde circuit court found support for its
view in the Supreme Court's summary reversal in Kimball.41
The holding of the Fourth Circuit, however, was narrowly stated,
and after briefly discussing the dissenting views of Circuit Judge Wid-
ener,42 the circuit court made explicit the narrowness of its holding,
limiting the scope of its decision to disputes concerning rights which
37. Id. at 551.
38. See, e.g., Ward Foods, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionary Workers
Union, 360 F. Supp. 1310, 1312 (S.D. N.Y. 1973); Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local
Union No. 246 v. Thompson's Dairy, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. 3403 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem.,
489 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The courts in each of these cases refused to hold arbitra-
ble disputes arising after the contract had expired. Thus, the decisions may be inter-
preted as impliedly limiting Wiley to disputes arising during the contract term, despite
the fact that Wiley is not cited in either of the cases. But note the exceptions of Kim-
ball, discussed supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text; Local Lodge No. 595, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. Howe Sound Co., Pa. Elec. Steel Castings Div., 350 F.2d 508, 511
(3d Cir. 1965); United Steelworkers v. H.K. Porter Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2201 (W.D. Pa.
1966).
39. 530 F.2d at 551-52. The circuit court noted that a collective bargaining agreement
is not simply a contract, but rather "covers the whole employment relationship. It calls
into being a new common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particu-
lar plant." Id. (quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550). Therefore, although an agreement is
terminated, an employer may still be compelled to arbitrate. Id.
40. Id. at 552.
41. Id. In Piano & Musical Instrument Workers v. W.W. Kimball Co., 333 F.2d 761
(7th Cir.), rev'd 379 U.S. 357 (1964), the Seventh Circuit had ruled that a dispute over
the rehiring of discharged employees did not require arbitration since the dispute had
arisen after the termination of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 333 F.2d at
765. The court in Nolde interpreted the Supreme Court's summary reversal, which cited
only Wiley and the Steelworker's Trilogy, 379 U.S. at 357, as indicating the Supreme
Court's approval of the application of the principles announced in Wiley to disputes
arising after a contract's expiration. 530 F.2d at 552.
42. Id. at 554-58 (Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Wid-
ener stated that the employer should be free to raise the question of arbitrability before
the arbitrator, citing Kimball as having a more limited effect than that attributed to it
by the majority. Id. (Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This argu-
ment was not considered by the Supreme Court, as it was not raised by Nolde's counsel
on appeal. 430 U.S. at 255 n.8.
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accrue during the contract's term, even when the action which triggers
assertion of these rights occurs after the termination date of the
contract.4 3
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit in a decision by
Chief Justice Burger, employing language much broader than that used
by the Fourth Circuit.4 4 As characterized by the Court, the determina-
tive fact in Nolde was that the parties disagreed as to whether the sev-
erance pay clause of the expired contract provided for accrual, during
its term, of severance benefits which might be payable upon a post-
contract lay-off.45 Thus, "[tihe dispute. . . although arising after the
expiration of the collective-bargaining contract, clearly arises under
that contract," because resolution of the dispute requires an interpre-
tation of the contract.46 The Court embraced the Fourth Circuit's in-
terpretation of prior case law47 and noted that the Wiley 4s and Kim-
ball49 decisions had implicitly rejected the notion that the time of filing
a grievance would automatically control the question of arbitrability.5 0
The Court noted that nothing in the arbitration clause of the Nolde
contract "expressly excludes from its operation a dispute which arises
under the contract, but which is based on events that occur after its
termination."51 In the absence of such express exclusion, the Court
would apply the strong presumption of arbitrability inherent in federal
43. Specifically, the court stated that:
[A] dispute that turns on whether parties intended certain accruable rights to be
enjoyable, even after contract expiration, must be arbitrated if the contract pro-
vided for arbitration of such disputes, even if the contingency giving rise to the
dispute itself transpired after expiration of the contract.
Our decision affects only those rights, like severance pay, that employees earn
and that may 'vest' for future enjoyment-contingent upon a particular event.
530 F.2d at 552-53 (footnote omitted).
44. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
45. Id. at 248-49.
46. Id. at 249.
47. 530 F.2d at 551-52. The Fourth Circuit read Wiley and Kimball as supportive of
the view that:
[a] dispute that turns on whether parties intended certain accruable rights to be
enjoyable, even after contract expiration, must be arbitrated if the contract pro-
vided for arbitration of such disputes, even if the contingency giving rise to the
dispute itself transpired after expiration of the contract.
Id. at 552.
48. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
49. 379 U.S. 357 (1964).
50. 430 U.S. at 250-53.
51. Id. at 253. The arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement provided
for a four-step procedure for all grievances. Id. at 245, 252. The Court concluded that,
having failed to expressly exclude arbitration of post-termination grievances, "the parties




labor policy 5 2 because "[a]ny other holding would permit the employer
to cut off all arbitration of severance pay claims by terminating an ex-
isting contract simultaneously with closing business operations."" The
Court then listed various other factors militating in favor of finding the
dispute arbitrable: (1) the parties' contractual agreement to submit
disputes over the meaning of the contract to arbitration rather than
the courts;5 (2) the fact that the contract was drafted in the context of
"well-established federal labor policy favoring arbitration as the means
of resolving disputes over the meaning and effect of collective bargain-
ing agreements;"5 5 and (3) the contracting parties' "confidence in the
arbitration process and an arbitrator's presumed special competence in
matters concerning bargaining agreements" which "does not terminate
with the contract," as well as the speed and economy of arbitration.6
Thus, the same factors which led the Court to embrace arbitration as
the preferred mechanism for settling labor disputes in the Steelwork-
ers Trilogy57 were again cited by the Court as partial justification for
imposing upon a protesting party the post-contractual obligation to
arbitrate.5 "
Various comments by the Court suggest as possible relevant con-
siderations in determining the arbitrability of post-contractual griev-
ances the timeliness of the grievance presentation" and the need to
construe a provision of the expired agreement.6 0 As to the latter con-
sideration, the Court stated that "where the dispute is over a provision
of the expired agreement, the presumptions favoring arbitrability must
be negated expressly or by clear implication."61 In construing the
Nolde decision, later courts and the Board have occasionally treated
52. The Court has consistently relied upon 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)(1976) as providing a
strong presumption in favor of arbitrability. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)(1976) states: "Final ad-
justment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement." Id.
53. 430 U.S. at 253.
54. Id. at 253-54.
55. Id. at 254.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
577-78 (1960).
58. 430 U.S. at 253-54. Indeed, the Court buttressed its policy arguments in Nolde
with extensive quotations from the Steelworkers Trilogy. Id. at 253-55.
59. Id. at 255 n.8. The Court stated that due to the prompt presentation of the griev-
ance in Nolde, it did not have to "speculate as to the arbitrability of post-termination
contractual claims which. . . are not asserted within a reasonable time after the con-
tract's expiration." Id. Later courts have seized upon these remarks and, perhaps mis-
guidedly, scrutinized the question of whether the union's presentation of its post-con-
tractual grievance was untimely. See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text.
60. 430 U.S. at 255.
61. Id.
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this brief, concluding statement as the entirety of the holding;62 thus, if
the contract does not expressly negate the preservation of arbitration
rights after its termination, and the dispute between the union and the
company arguably involves a term of the expired contract, the ten-
dency has been, with rare exceptions, to find the dispute arbitrable.63
It is significant to note that the Supreme Court in Nolde had
nothing to say about the careful limitations which the Fourth Circuit
had imposed on its own holding. Although some later courts have seen
the need for similar limitations," the majority of post-Nolde authority
has broadly, and perhaps mistakenly, construed the Supreme Court's
holding not to be so delimited, but rather to authorize arbitration of
almost every variety of post-expiration contractual dispute.65
H. THE DUTY TO ARBITRATE POST-CONTRACTUAL DIsPUTEs AFTER
NOLDE
A. Issues Under the National Labor Relations Act
Prior to Nolde, the Board took the position that an employer's
duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations
Act of 19356 did not include a duty to arbitrate grievances in the ab-
62. See, e.g., American Sink Top & Cabinet Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979) discussed
infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
63. Compare American Sink Top & Cabinet Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979) (employee
discharged after contract expiration still entitled to arbitration of grievance since griev-
ance based in expired contract and no indication given that parties intended arbitration
provisions to, end with contract's term) with Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v.
Madison Newspapers, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (where contract had ex-
pired and union does not allege events complained of arose under the expired contract,
no arbitration is required) aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980).
64. See, e.g., Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc.,
444 F.Supp. 1223 (W.D. Wis. 1978), afl'd mem., 622 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980), discussed
infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text; Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Serv. Em-
ployee's Union, 605 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed infra notes 159-76 and accompa-
nying text.
65. See, e.g., American Sink Top & Cabinet Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979). Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist, dissenting in Nolde, stated that the Court's decision rested on a
false assumption about the "continuing relationship" between the parties in a plant-clos-
ing situation, and noted that the expiration of the no-strike agreement extinguished any
quid pro quo upon which a continued duty to arbitrate could be based. 430 U.S. at 256-
57 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Wiley and Kimball were both distinguished on the ground
that in both those cases the contracts were still in force at the time the dispute arose. Id.
at 255-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. The duty to bargain is grounded in § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), which provides that an employer's refusal to bargain collec-
tively with the representative of its employees constitutes an unfair labor practice. Con-
versely, a similar duty to bargain is imposed upon unions by § 8(b)(3), Id. § 158(b)(3).
The scope of the duty to bargain as to both employer and union is broadly defined in §
8(d), Id. § 158(d).
[Vol. 28
POST-CONTRACTUAL ARBITRABILITY
sence of a presently effective collective bargaining agreement contain-
ing an arbitration clause. Thus, in Hilton-Davis Chemical Co.,6 7 the
Board rejected the argument that during a hiatus between effective
contracts, an employer could be required to arbitrate grievances that
involved employee rights subject to mandatory collective bargaining.6
The union had argued that the employer's continuing duty to bargain
(in the absence of a contract) over individual grievances presented by
the union-a duty which the Board had expressly imposed in the
past 9-- also included the duty to bring those grievances before an arbi-
trator.70 The union relied on prior Board decisions holding that an em-
ployer could not unilaterally terminate operation of the contractual
grievance procedure upon contract expiration.7 1 The Board stated that
those cases did not go as far as the union contended, because an actual
duty to arbitrate had not been imposed.7 2 The Board observed that
arbitration was solely a creation of contract; thus, in the absence of an
effective, valid contract, an employer's only obligation with respect to
grievances was to bargain in good faith.73 If the expired contract con-
67. 185 N.L.R.B. 241 (1970).
68. Id. at 242.
69. See Bethlehem Steel Co. (Shipbuilding Div.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1347 (1961), enforce-
ment denied sub nom., Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of Amer.
v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964), where the Board
stated that a greivance procedure is a mandatory bargaining subject and held that an
employer's unilateral action in altering prior procedures was unlawful and in violation of
its duty to bargain. 136 N.L.R.B. at 1503. But see Kingsport Publishing Corp., 165
N.L.R.B. 694, enforcement denied, 399 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1968), where the Board af-
firmed the trial examiner's ruling that the employer violated its duty to bargain by not
adhering to the grievance procedure in the contract. 165 N.L.R.B. at 694-96. On appeal,
however, the circuit court denied enforcement by holding that insufficient evidence was
presented to show the existence of a grievance procedure under the expired contract.
Accordingly, the procedure was found not to be a part of an "established operational
pattern" at the company and therefore, the company had not unlawfully upset the status
quo by resisting attempts to settle grievances by means other than direct negotiations
with the Union. 399 F.2d at 662.
70. 185 N.L.R.B. at 241-42. During the two-month period when no agreement was in
effect, twenty-eight grievances were filed. Twenty of these grievances were settled within
the first three steps of the grievance procedure and the union requested that the remain-
ing eight be submitted to arbitration. Id.
71. See Bethlehem Steel, 136 N.L.R.B. at 1503, discussed supra note 69.
72. 185 N.L.R.B. at 242-43. The Board noted that neither Bethlehem Steel nor King-
sport involved "a failure to arbitrate, but rather a failure to follow established channels
for discussion ... over employee grievances." Id. The Board maintained that Bethlehem
Steel involved an employer's unilateral attempt to impose a new grievance procedure
which undercut the union's representative status, and that Kingsport simply involved an
employer's failure to bargain. Id.
73. Id. at 242. The parties to an arbitration agreement voluntarily and mutually
agreed to surrender the use of their respective economic weapons in favor of third party
determinations. Id. In the absence of such consensual surrender, the parties must at-
tempt to reach agreement in good faith but are under no statutory mandate to reach
19831
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tained a grievance procedure, the duty to bargain in good faith in-
cluded the duty to keep that procedure in place until an impasse in
bargaining occurred, and then to follow the normal rules governing im-
plementation of contract proposals upon impasse.7 4 However, as the
duty to bargain does not include the duty to agree7, during the con-
tract hiatus the parties are in a state of "free" collective bargaining;7"
in the absence of a no-strike clause as a quid pro quo for arbitration,
there is no duty to arbitrate.
77
As the dissenters in Nolde noteds78 the Supreme Court's holding
was inconsistent with the analysis previously adopted by the Board in
Hilton-Davis.79 It is, therefore, not surprising that the Board soon
overruled Hilton-Davis in light of Nolde.80 What is surprising, how-
ever, is that the Board chose to overrule Hilton-Davis in a case where
the Fourth Circuit panel in Nolde would probably have held the dis-
pute to be non-arbitrable.""
In American Sink Top & Cabinet Co.,82 the employer had dis-
charged an employee three months after the contract had expired.8 3
agreement. Id. The Board stated that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to sub-
mit." Id. (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960)).
74. Id. An employer may not abandon contractually established channels for resolv-
ing employee grievances. Such unilateral employer action would amount to a failure to
bargain in good faith with regard to terms and conditions of employment thereby sub-
verting the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. Id.
75. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), states that the obligation to bargain "does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Id.
76. 185 N.L.R.B. at 242.
77. Id. at 243. This is one of the arguments advanced by the dissenters in Nolde. 430
U.S. at 257 (Stewart, J., dissenting). They argued that any reason for implying a continu-
ing duty on the part of the employer to arbitrate, as a quid pro quo for the union's
offsetting, enforceable no-strike obligation, is foreclosed when the union terminates its
contract and thus its obligation not to strike. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). This argument
has been raised without success in some post-Nolde cases in an effort to oppose the
imposition of a duty to arbitrate during a strike. See United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt
Steel Casting Div., 635 F.2d 1071, 1076 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981);
see infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
78. 430 U.S. 243, 257 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 257 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart maintained that the Board in
Hilton-Davis viewed arbitration as an obligation that arose solely out of contract and
although it was favored as a dispute resolving mechanism, it was not statutorily required.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
80. See American Sink Top & Cabinet Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979), discussed infra
notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
81. See supra text accompanying note 43.
82. 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979).
83. Id. The contract had expired on May 1, 1978. On July 24, 1978 the employer
discharged Richard Davis who had suffered an injury several months before and who had
not been on the active payroll since. Id. at 411.
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The union immediately filed a grievance, but the employer refused to
deal with it, stating that "inasmuch as we do not have a valid union
contract, we do not utilize the grievance procedure in any termina-
tion. '8 4 The union charged that the employer's refusal to process its
grievance violated section 8(a)(5).8 5 The Administrative Law Judge
[ALJ], citing Hilton-Davis, agreed with the union and ordered the em-
ployer to entertain the grievance in accord with the procedures of the
expired contract.8 6 The ALJ noted, however, that the employer was not
obligated to arbitrate the discharge grievance, citing Justice Stewart's
dissent in Nolde as well as Hilton-Davis.7
The Board agreed with the ALJ that the employer was obligated
to entertain the grievance,s but it modified the order to require that
the employer submit the grievance to arbitration if requested by the
union, on the ground that the grievance was "arguably" based on the
expired contract.89
The Board's broad reading of Nolde completely ignored the dis-
tinction drawn by the Fourth Circuit in its Nolde opinion. The Fourth
Circuit had noted that its holding did not apply to disputes involving
individual employee grievances or non-accruable rights which arise af-
ter the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.90 The Board,
however, read Nolde to mean that if a dispute would have been arbi-
trable if it occurred when the contract was in effect, it remained arbi-
trable even though it occurred after the contract expired, regardless of
the nature of the dispute, so long as the grievance was "arguably"
raised as a contractual dispute and the contract did not expressly state
that the duty to arbitrate terminated with the contract's expiration.9 '
84. Id. at 408.
85. 242 N.L.R.B. at 410. The expired contract provided for a grievance committee
and, in the event of deadlock at the committee level, referral to arbitration. Id. at 411.
86. 242 N.L.R.B. at 412. The ALJ concluded that the employer was under a duty to
adhere to the prevailing terms of employment, even after expiration of the contract, and
that it therefore violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) when it refused to resolve the em-
ployee's termination under the prevailing grievance procedure. Id.
87. Id. n.13.
88. Id. at 408. The Board adopted the ALJ's finding that the employer violated the
Act by refusing to abide by the grievance procedure in the expired contract. This action,
the Board concluded, amounted to an unlawful unilateral change in the terms and condi-
tions of employment. Id.
89. Id. The Board also determined that there was no reason to conclude that the
parties had intended the arbitration provision to terminate with the contract. Relying on
Nolde, the Board ordered arbitration with regard to the discharge of Davis. Id.
90. 530 F.2d at 553.
91. 242 N.L.R.B. at 408. Specifically, the Board noted:
In Nolde . . . however, the Supreme Court held that, where the parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement have agreed to subject certain matters to a
grievance and arbitration process, "the parties' obligations under their arbitra-
tion clause survive contract termination when the dispute [is] over an obligation
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In American Sink Top,9 2 the dispute arose from a discharge which
took place several months after the contract had expired.9 3 The union
claimed that the discharge violated the expired contract.9 ' The Board,
holding the discharge to be subject to arbitration, concluded that
"[tihe grievance's basis is 'arguably'--at least-the contract, and there
is no reason to conclude that the parties had intended the arbitration
provisions to end with the contract's term. In light of Nolde, we shall
order the arbitration of the discharge. . . . "9 Thus, for the Board, the
central holding of Nolde was that if the contract does not state that
the duty to arbitrate terminates upon contract expiration, then any-
thing which could be arbitrated under the contract during its term can
be arbitrated under the contract after its term.96
In sum, the Board's present position appears to be that any griev-
ance which is presented to the employer after a contract has expired
will be subject to mandatory arbitration if two conditions are met.
First, the grievance must have been arbitrable under the expired con-
arguably created by the expired agreement.". . . That obligation is not termi-
nated merely by the parties' failure to expressly cover this situation. As the
Court stated generally in Nolde, in the "absence of some contrary indication,
there are strong reasons to conclude that the parties did not intend their arbitra-
tion duties to terminate automatically with the contract."
Id. (quoting Nolde, 430 U.S. at 252, 253) (citations omitted).
92. 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 410.
95. Id. at 408.
96. This broad and generalized interpretation of Nolde was presaged in Goya Foods,
Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1978), where the Board held that a union's duty not to strike
was co-extensive with its right to arbitrate a post-contractual grievance. Id. at 1466. The
dispute in Goya arose out of discharges occurring shortly before the pertinent contract
had expired. After the contract expired the employees struck in support of the griev-
ances and the employer subsequently hired strike replacements. The Board held that the
strikers had no right to reinstatement because their strike violated the contractual no-
strike obligation and thus was not protected under section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Id. at 1467-
68.
An example of a contract which was found to expressly provide for the termination
of the duty to arbitrate is the contract construed in S. & W. Motor Lines, 236 N.L.R.B.
938 (1978), modified 621 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1980). The pertinent contract language was:
The Grievance Committee referred to above is known as "The Piedmont Griev-
ance Committee." The Parties agree to remain parties to the Piedmont Griev-
ance Committee during the term of this Contract Agreement and to use the
Committee as a means of peaceful settlement of Grievance [sic] during the term
of this contract agreement.
236 N.L.R.B. at 949-50 n.19. The Administrative Law Judge construed this contract lan-
guage to mean that the contract specifically limited the obligation to participate in the
grievance procedure to "the term of the 'Contract Agreement' only." Id. at 949. Because
resort to the grievance procedure through the Committee was a necessary prerequisite to
arbitration under the contract, this constituted an express or clear negation of the pre-
sumption that the duty to arbitrate survived expiration of the contract. Id. at 949-50.
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tract, and second, there must be no contractual language stating that
the duty to arbitrate terminates upon the expiration of the contract.0 '
This position is best supported by the duty to bargain rationale re-
jected by the Board in Hilton-Davis s That is, as arbitration of griev-
ances is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and as an employer may
not unilaterally change its policies with respect to a mandatory subject
of bargaining"" without first negotiating to impasse with the union,100
then the duty to arbitrate grievances continues past the contract term
until such time as the employer has fulfilled his bargaining duty and
thus lawfully may unilaterally suspend that policy. In this regard, it is
noteworthy that upon reaching a bargaining impasse, °10 an employer is
free to make unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment, so long as the employer does not implement terms more
favorable to the employees than those last offered to the union."0 2 If
this rationale is adopted by the Board for determining whether a post-
contractual duty to arbitrate exists for purposes of section 8(a)(5), the
97. But see Cardinal Operating Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 279 (1979), where the Board failed
to apply its American Sink Top ruling in a case which seemed to present the paradigm
situation under the Board's broad interpretation of Nolde. In Cardinal, however, the
Union's contention was that the Company had orally agreed to extend the expired con-
tract through the hiatus period, id. at 284, and no argument was made that the post-
expiration grievances were based on the expired contract. Id. at 286. Consequently,
neither Nolde nor American Sink Top are even mentioned in the decision. Cf. Digmor
Equip., 261 N.L.R.B. No. 176, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1209 (1982), a recent decision where
the Board applied American Sink Top to find arbitrable a post-contractual discharge.
Chairman Van de Water, however, concurred only on the ground that some of the con-
duct underlying the discharge occurred prior to the contract termination, and indicated
that he would not find arbitrable a discharge based solely on post-contractual events. Id.
at 1211 (Van de Water, Chairman, concurring).
98. 185 N.L.R.B. 241, 242 (1970). See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the "duty to bargain" rationale rejected by the Board in Hilton-Davis.
99. In general, mandatory subjects of bargaining are issues relating to "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1976); Allied Chemi-
cal & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 164 (1971).
100. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 747 (1962).
101. A bargaining impasse occurs when there is a suspension of negotiations after a
bona fide but unsuccessful attempt to reach an agreement. NLRB v. Andrew Jergens
Co., 175 F.2d 130, 136 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 882
(1949). Adamant insistence on a bargaining position with regard to a mandatory subject
of bargaining is not per se a refusal to bargain in good faith, even if it results in a bar-
gaining impasse. Chevron Oil Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1067, 1072 (5th Cir. 1971). "Con-
gress did not compel agreement.. . [but] did require collective bargaining in the hope
that agreements would result." NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
"Each case must turn upon its particular facts. The inquiry must always be whether or
not under the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obligation to bargain in
good-faith has been met." Id. at 153-54. For an example of a bona fide but unsuccessful
attempt to reach an agreement, see NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
102. NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 615 (1st Cir. 1963); Pacific Gamble
Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106, 110 (6th Cir. 1950).
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Board would avoid the problems encountered by federal courts in sec-
tion 301 actions in determining, inter alia, how long the duty to arbi-
trate persists,103 or whether a particular grievance is subject to post-
contractual arbitrability. 10
This rationale need only be invoked by the Board in cases where
all of the events giving rise to a grievance have occurred after contract
expiration. 10 5 If the events occurred prior to expiration, then substan-
tive arbitrability may be said to have "attached" to the events upon
their occurrence, and a straightforward Wiley analysis naturally
follows. 106
This suggested rationale raises the additional question whether
the duty to arbitrate under section 8(a)(5) is or must be coextensive in
time with the ability to compel arbitration under section 301. The for-
mer is really a manifestation of the complex of rules governing the
duty to bargain in good faith, which is founded in statutory policy, 07
103. See infra text accompanying notes 186-97 & 227-31 for a discussion of cases
construing the Supreme Court's cryptic "reasonable time" footnote in Nolde, 430 U.S. at
255 n.8.
104. See, e.g., Federated Metals Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 648 F.2d 856 (3d Cir.)
(dispute concerning benefits accrued after contract expiration and while employees were
on strike held arbitrable), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 567 (1981). Discussed infra notes 208-
26 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc.,
444 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Wisc. 1978) discussed infra notes 128-33 and accompanying
text.
106. Wiley was construed by the Court in Nolde to hold that the time of filing of a
grievance is irrelevant to the question of arbitrability, provided that the events giving
rise to the grievance occurred prior to the expiration of the duty to arbitrate. 430 U.S. at
251-52. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
107. "Good faith" is defined in § 8(d):
To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1978).
Lack of good faith in the bargaining process has been found in both particular acts
of the parties and in their overall bargaining policy. In NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149 (1956), the Court held that management's refusal to provide the union with
information on its financial status while negotiating wage increases was not bargaining in
good faith.
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer
should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an in-
crease in wages .... [I]t would certainly not be farfetched for a trier of fact to
reach the conclusion that bargaining lacks good faith when an employer mechan-




while the latter is a matter of contract interpretation under federal la-
bor law as developed judicially, with incidental reference to Board de-
cisions as merely one factor or indicator of the substance of such law.108
An analogy to the general subject of breaches and unilateral changes of
collective bargaining agreements provides guidance. It is by now rea-
sonably well established that not every breach of a collective bargain-
ing agreement is an unfair labor practice;109 only those contract
breaches which concern mandatory subjects of bargaining will be held
to violate section 8(a)(5), on the theory that such breaches constitute
unilateral changes without prior negotiation.110 Similarly, an em-
ployer's refusal to arbitrate a dispute will violate the duty to bargain
only if the employer has, by such refusal, unilaterally changed a term
or condition of employment without prior negotiation."" Thus, a court
Id. at 152-53. In NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1970), the court held
that an employer cannot
combine "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining methods with a widely publicized
stance of unbending firmness that he is himself unable to alter a position once
taken .... It . . . constitutes . . . an absence of subjective good faith, for it
implies that the Company can deliberately bargain and communicate as though
the Union did not exist ....
Id. at 762-63.
108. It is clear that under section 301 arbitration can only be compelled to the extent
that there is a contractual agreement to arbitrate. Blake Construction Co., Inc. v. Labor-
ers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 511 F.2d 324, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Independent Petroleum
Workers of Am., Inc. v. American Oil Co., 324 F.2d 903, 904 (7th Cir.), aff'd mem., 379
U.S. 130, reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 985 (1964). The duty of the federal courts is to deter-
mine if the dispute is one which the parties intended should be subject to arbitration
under the contract. In resolving this issue the applicable law is federal law as developed
by the federal courts. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448,
456 (1957). In formulating this federal contract law the courts may look for guidance to
federal statutes, federal court decisions, and state court decisions as well as Board deci-
sions. Id. at 456-57. There is an apparent presumption in favor of finding disputes to be
arbitrable if the contract has an arbitration clause. Local Union No. 4 Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Radio Thirteen-Eighty, Inc., 469 F.2d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1972).
109. See, e.g., Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (unilateral modification of non-mandatory subject of bargaining
not an unfair labor practice).
110. Id. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass the Supreme Court held that a unilateral modifi-
cation of a term in a collective bargaining agreement was only an unfair labor practice if
the modified term dealt with a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 185. Changes in
terms which are merely permissive subjects of bargaining could give rise to a section 301
action for breach of contract or to grievances for arbitration, but do not violate the duty
to bargain under section 8(a)(5). Id. at 188.
111. See, e.g., General Warehousemen and Employees Union Local No. 636 v. J.C.
Penney Co., 484 F. Supp. 130 (W.D. Pa. 1980), where the employer's refusal to submit a
grievance to arbitration was held not to be a violation of the duty to bargain. Id. at 132.
The duty to arbitrate was found not to be a term or condition of employment because
the contract containing the arbitration clause had expired, and the arbitration clause was
expressly limited to grievances arising "during the term" of the contract. Id. at 137-38.
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in a section 301 action might find that the contractual duty to arbitrate
still exists, even though the employer has satisfied its statutory bar-
gaining duty by waiting until a negotiating impasse before refusing to
arbitrate grievances, and an arbitrator might find that a collective bar-
gaining agreement has been breached, subjecting an employer to dam-
ages or remedial orders, even though the breach is not a violation of
the statutory duty to bargain."1 2 Consequently, using the suggested ra-
tionale to underpin the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice for a
pre-impasse, post-contractual refusal to arbitrate is not inconsistent
with the Board's approach to unilateral change cases generally.11 3
Perhaps more significantly, using the suggested rationale would al-
low the Board to avoid the task of having to determine whether a
grievance based on post-contractual events fits within the Nolde ana-
lytical framework, a task which is none too easy given the ambiguities
of the Nolde decision. 114 Rather, the question for the Board would sim-
ply be whether the duty to arbitrate existed when the events giving
rise to the grievance occurred, based upon whether the parties had
reached an impasse in bargaining. Determining whether an impasse ex-
ists is a frequently occurring task in Board litigation, and the Board
has developed much expertise in this area.1 5 On the other hand, the
112. See generally Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc.,
102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982). These two recent Supreme Court decisions with respect to the
availability of injunctive relief against politically inspired work stoppages provide yet
another example of this phenomenon, albeit in reverse. In each of these cases the Court
held that the refusals of longshoremen to handle grain bound for the Soviet Union could
not be enjoined at the employer's behest in a § 301 action; however, the employer could
recover damages against the union under § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), a provision authorizing damage actions for violations of the "sec-
ondary boycott" provisions of § 8(b)(4). Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. at 2685; International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
Allied Int'l, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 1662-63. The Court reasoned that an injunction in aid of
arbitration should not issue in these cases because the underlying dispute was not a
dispute arising under the contract. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. at 2681 n. 12; International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
Allied Int'l, Inc., 102 S. Ct. at 1664.
113. See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text for the Board's usual approach to
unilateral change cases.
114. See supra note 3 for citations of commentaries criticizing the ambiguities of the
Nolde decision.
115. See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 102 S. Ct. 720 (1982) (Board's
refusal to accept the existence of an impasse accorded great deference by the Court).
Chief Justice Burger opined that: "Because unions and employers have important rights
which arise upon impasse, the Board and the courts have acquired considerable experi-
ence in determining whether an impasse exists." Id. at 732 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See
also NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163
N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), afl'd sub nom; AFTRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Of
course, where the parties' agreement expressly negated post-contractual arbitrability, the
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question whether a dispute falls within the arbitrability sphere carved
out by Nolde is a new area of developing case law which has produced
differing opinions in various federal circuit courts;116 as such, it is a
morass which the Board should avoid, especially since there is a more
clear-cut alternative for deciding these cases which is consistent with
already-developed theories under section 8(a)(5).'1
7
B. Issues in Suits Brought Under Section 301 of the Act
The question of a continuing duty to arbitrate grievances after a
contract has expired more frequently arises in the context of suits to
compel or to stay arbitration brought under section 301 of the Act. ' It
also arises in actions to confirm, enforce or vacate awards already ren-
dered by an arbitrator.11 9 Many courts have given Nolde a very broad
reading in this context.'2 0 A few, however, have attempted to observe
some of the distinctions which the Fourth Circuit mentioned in its
Nolde decision.
12
In Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Post
Co.,12 2 a case which was decided shortly after the Supreme Court an-
nounced its Nolde decision, the union sought to compel arbitration of
refusal of a party to arbitrate a post-contractual grievance would not violate the duty to
bargain. See, e.g., General Warehousemen and Employees Union Local No. 636 v. J.C.
Penney Co., 484 F. Supp. 130 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
116. Compare Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Serv. Employees Union, 605 F.2d 1290
(2d Cir. 1979) (scope of arbitrable grievances limited to disputes arising "under" the
contract), discussed infra notes 159-76 and accompanying text with Federated Metals
Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 648 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1981) (dispute remained arbitrable
even though it arose after the expiration of the contract), discussed infra notes 208-31
and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 99-102 for a discussion of § 8(a)(5) in the context of a refusal to
arbitrate.
118. See, e.g., Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc.,
444 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Wis. 1978), discussed infra notes 128-40 and accompanying
text; Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Post Co., 442 F. Supp. 1060
(D.D.C. 1977), discussed infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text; Modern Sheet Metal
Supply Co., Inc. v. Wolf, 61 A.D.2d 966, 403 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1st Dep't 1978), discussed
infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Serv. Employees Union, 605 F.2d 1290
(2d Cir. 1979) (arbitrator's award to union confirmed because the award drew its essence
from the contract), discussed infra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Modern Sheet Metal Supply Co., Inc. v. Wolf, 61 A.D.2d 966, 403
N.Y.S.2d 267 (1st Dep't 1978), discussed infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
121. See Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 444
F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Wis. 1978), discussed infra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
See also Textile Workers Local 129 v. Columbia Mills, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y.
1978), discussed infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
122. 442 F. Supp. 1060 (D.D.C. 1977).
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discharges which occurred after the expiration of a contract. 123 The
court found that the parties had agreed to extend the terms of their
contract, including the arbitration provisions, to cover the hiatus pe-
riod until a new contract was consummated.12 Consequently, it was
not necessary to decide whether the court could direct arbitration of
the discharges in the absence of an express continuing agreement to
arbitrate.12 5 The court, however, citing Nolde, noted that the dispute
dealt with "arbitration requirements associated with employment dis-
charges, with a resulting impact on the right to job security which we
believe to be an 'obligation created by the expired agreement.' ,,126
Thus, although such a construction was not necessary to the case, the
district court apparently read Nolde, by implication, to require arbitra-
tion of discharge grievances which arose after contract expiration, thus
adopting a broad interpretation similar to that later embraced by the
Board in American Sink Top.2
27
In Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Madison Newspa-
pers, Inc., 28 a suit brought by the union to compel arbitration, the
union alleged that the employer was obligated to arbitrate grievances
which arose subsequent to the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement. 29 Unfortunately, the nature of the disputed issues of the
grievances is not specified in the court's opinion. The union's allega-
tion, however, was not that the grievances arose under the expired con-
tract,"30 but rather that they involved employer actions in derogation
of terms and conditions of employment which the employer was obli-
gated to maintain by virtue of its continuing duty to bargain.' 3' The
court rejected the contention that the Nolde doctrine could be stretch-
ed so far as to cover grievances where there was no allegation that they
"arose" under the expired contract.'" 2 The court's decision appears to
123. Id. at 1062.
124. Id. The court's finding that the parties had agreed to extend the terms of their
contract was based on "the use of the word 'terms' in Article I of the Agreement in a
broad context, the failure of the parties to organize the agreement consistent with the
distinction advanced by [the company], and the noticeably strong concern of the parties
regarding arbitration . . ." Id.
125. Id. at 1063. The court's conclusion that "the arbitration provisions [were]
'terms' of the agreement and remained operational beyond April 1 by virtue of said
agreement" made it unnecessary to decide whether the court could direct arbitration in
the absence of an express continuing agreement. Id.
126. Id. n.3 (quoting Nolde, 430 U.S. at 252).
127. For a discussion of the Board's broad interpretation of Nolde in American Sink
Top, see supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
128. 444 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Wis. 1978).
129. Id. at 1224.
130. Id. at 1227.
131. Id. at 1225.
132. Id. at 1226-27. The court found that the complaint failed to state a cause of
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be at least semantically correct, inasmuch as the Supreme Court in
Nolde did state that a dispute must "arise" under the expired contract
in order to be arbitrable after the contract's expiration. 133 The result,
however, seems clearly inconsistent with the Board's holding in Ameri-
can Sink Top. 34 Inasmuch as a grievance over a post-contractual dis-
charge must be premised upon maintaining the contractual standards
of "just cause" after the expiration of the contract, 135 it would seem
that the union in American Sink Top must have been advancing the
same theory advanced by the union in Madison Newspapers-that a
post-contractual discharge could be challenged for lack of "just
cause."'38 The Board accepted this theory, 3 7 as apparently did the
District of Columbia District Court in its Washington Post dictum, 3
but the Wisconsin district court in Madison Newpapers was appar-
ently, without articulating its reasoning as such, applying the distinc-
tion denoted by the Fourth Circuit in Nolde-that only grievances in-
volving rights accrued under the expired contract could be arbitrable
action because the union failed to allege that "the events of which it [was] complaining
'arose' under the contract which [had] expired." Id. at 1227.
133. 430 U.S. at 249. In effect, the union in Madison Newspapers was advancing the
rationale which is suggested herein for determinations by the Board of whether a refusal
to arbitrate a post-contractual dispute violates the duty to bargain under § 8(a)(5). See
supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. Accord, O'Connor Co., Inc. v. Carpenter's
Union Local 1408, 534 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
134. 242 N.L.R.B. at 408. The Board in American Sink Top held that "there [was]
no reason to conclude that the parties had intended the arbitration provisions to end
with the contract's term." Id. See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of American Sink Top.
135. At least, this is the case with respect to discharges based solely on events occur-
ring after contract expiration.
136. 242 N.L.R.B. at 410. In American Sink Top the union contended that the
company:
[W]as under a duty to adhere to the prevailing terms and conditions of employ-
ment even after the May 1 expiration of the bargaining contract, and that it
consequently violated Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) . . .when it declined the
Union's July request that the ... termination be treated under the prevailing
procedure, and in so doing unilaterally disavowed the continuing operation of
the grievance procedure....
Id. at 412. In Madison Newspapers the union argued that:
[B]ecause an employer cannot make unilateral changes in the terms and condi-
tions governing employee members of a bargaining unit without agreement with
the exclusive bargaining representative unless and until impasse has been
reached, all of the terms and conditions of the expired collective bargaining
agreement continued in effect up to the date of impasse.
444 F. Supp. at 1225-26.
137. 242 N.L.R.B. at 411.
138. 442 F. Supp. at 1063. The Washington Post court intimated that it would have
"direct[ed] arbitration after the termination of a collective bargaining agreement [be-
cause] the right to job security [was] 'an obligation created by the expired agreement.'"
Id. at 1063 & n.3 (quoting Nolde, 430 U.S. at 252).
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after the contract's termination.139 Discharges did not fall within that
category.14 0
A broad view of Nolde was embraced by a New York state court in
Modern Sheet Metal Supply Co. v. Wolf,1 " where an employer
brought suit to stay an arbitration over the obligation to continue pay-
ing contributions to a welfare and pension fund after the expiration of
a contract. 42 A question was presented as to whether the collective
bargaining agreement had actually expired, and the court held that the
question whether a contract has expired, by virtue of its own terms, is
arbitrable.'" Further, whether the employer was required to pay the
contributions in question was also an issue for arbitration, regardless of
whether the agreement had terminated, since it related to "'an obliga-
tion arguably created by the "expired" agreement,' and accordingly
survived contract termination. '144 This decision ventures far beyond
the facts in Nolde and certainly ignores the distinctions specified by
the Fourth Circuit, 45 dealing as it does with questions of payments
due for work performed after expiration of the contract.1 48
In Textile Workers of America Local 129 v. Columbia Mills,
139. 444 F. Supp. at 1226-27. The Madison Newspapers court articulated the Nolde
standard and then observed that "in the case before [it] the union [made] no allegation
that the events of which it [was] complaining 'arose' under the contract which [had]
expired. . ." Id. at 1227. The Nolde Court reasoned that "the parties' failure to exclude
from arbitrability contract disputes arising after termination ... afford[ed] a basis for
concluding that they intended to arbitrate all grievances arising out of the contractual
relationship." 430 U.S. at 255.
140. 444 F. Supp. at 1226-27. The Madison Newspapers court recognized that there
"are some situations in which.., the obligation to arbitrate survives the expiration of
the contract;" however, it dismissed the claim because the union had failed to allege that
"the events of which it (was] complaining 'arose' under the contract which [had] ex-
pired. . . ." Id.
141. 61 A.D.2d 966, 403 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1st Dep't 1978).
142. Id. at 966-67, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
143. Id. at 967, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 268. The Modern Sheet court reasoned that when
dealing with "a broad arbitration provision, the issue whether the acts or conduct of the
parties terminated, modified or renewed the agreement is properly for the arbitrators to
decide." Id.
144. Id. (quoting Nolde, 430 U.S. at 252).
145. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for the distinctions specified by the
Fourth Circuit in Nolde.
146. 61 A.D.2d at 967, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 268. Modern Sheet is also contradicted by
Diamond Glass Corp. v. Local 206, Glass Warehouse Workers, 682 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1982) (no logical indication that the union's complaint related to the period or the rights
covered by the expired agreement). See also District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v.
Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (the arbi-
trability of the union's claims that its members were discharged without cause depends




Inc.,1 47 the union brought suit seeking to compel arbitration over the
employer's decision to discontinue paying certain benefits to retired
employees after it had closed its business. 48 The employees' grievance
was presented while the collective bargaining agreement was still in ef-
fect, but the request to arbitrate was made after the contract had ter-
minated.149 The company advanced several arguments against arbitra-
tion, among them that the grievance need not be submitted to
arbitration because the demand for arbitration came after the expira-
tion of the contract. 5 0 The court held that Nolde applied, inasmuch as
the dispute was over the question whether the expired contract had
provided permanent benefits for retirees.' 5' This appears to be a
straightforward application of the Nolde doctrine, within the spirit of
the Fourth Circuit's original Nolde decision.
52
In Local 589, ILGWU v. Kellwood Co.,' 53 the Eighth Circuit spe-
cifically rejected any notion that the determination of arbitrability
should turn upon whether rights "accrued" during the term of an ex-
pired contract.15 4 The union brought suit to compel arbitration over
the question whether the company was required to make pension pay-
ments to employees by virtue of an expired contract which stated that
the company would "maintain" pension payments at a certain level.' 55
The company argued that pursuant to Nolde the court could not com-
pel arbitration unless it found that the pension rights accrued during
the term of a collective agreement.' 56 The court took a contrary view,
noting that under Nolde the time when a dispute arose or when rights
accrued is not the determinative factor with respect to questions of
arbitrability. Rather, the critical question is whether the disputed obli-
147. 471 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
148. Id. at 528.
149. Id. at 528-29.
150. Id. at 531. The Company contended that "termination of the collective bargain-
ing agreement released the Union from its no-strike pledge and the Company from its
agreement to arbitrate, the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause." Id.
151. Id. at 531. The Columbia Mills court concluded that the "grievance [was] sub-
ject to arbitration if the Company... indicated its intention to eliminate the benefits
provided to retirees ... at some particular time in the future." Id.
152. Indeed, the court could have reached the same decision in this case pursuant to
Wiley, because the grievance was raised prior to contract expiration. 471 F. Supp. at 528-
29. Therefore, the decision is implicitly within the spirit of the Fourth Circuit's Nolde
decision, as Wiley is clearly within Nolde because in Wiley the dispute had occurred
prior to the expiration of the contract. 367 U.S. at 548. For a discussion of Wiley see
supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
153. 592 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1979).
154. Id. at 1011-12.
155. Id. The company had contracted to maintain pension benefits which had been in
effect immediately prior to the execution of the agreement. Id.
156. Id. at 1011.
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gation was arguably created by the agreement. 157 Consequently, be-
cause the rights to a pension were "created" by the expired contract,
the Eighth Circuit would hold the dispute arbitrable, regardless of
when the claim to pension benefits arose.' 58
In Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Service Employees Union,159
the Second Circuit embraced a much narrower, fact-limited view of
Nolde. Rochdale presented a rather complicated factual maze for the
court. The employer had decided to subcontract certain work per-
formed by bargaining unit employees, but determined to avoid difficul-
ties by waiting until after its contract had expired.6 0 The parties were
negotiating for a new contract, pursuant to the union's notification
that it desired to negotiate a successor agreement to its expiring con-
tract.' " ' No agreement on a new contract was reached by the termina-
tion date, and the next day the company subcontracted the work and
the union struck.16' A few months later, the union demanded arbitra-
tion of the subcontracting decision, contending that the contract had
not automatically expired but rather had continued in effect pursuant
to an automatic renewal feature.68 The company brought an action to
stay arbitration, the union cross-moved to compel arbitration, and the
district court ordered arbitration on the issues of both contract termi-
nation and subcontracting.-64 The arbitrator ruled that the contract
had not terminated and ordered the company to cease the subcontract-
ing relationship. 6 5 The union brought an action to confirm the award,
and the district court, holding that the award drew its essence from the
contract, confirmed it.'
The company appealed this decision to the Second Circuit, which
held that the original arbitration order of the district court had been
157. Id. at 1012.
158. Id. The employees were claiming pension benefits which arose prior to the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The company, however, had assumed the obligation to
"maintain" pre-agreement benefits. Thus, the disputed pension rights were a creation of
the contract and subject to arbitration. Id.
159. 605 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 1293.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The collective bargaining agreement contained a duration clause providing
for automatic renewal, subject to written notice by either party within a specified period,
indicating its desire to modify, amend or terminate. Id. The Union contended that the
Company's termination was ineffective in that it did not comply with the duration provi-
sion. Id. at 1296.
164. Id. at 1294.
165. Id. The arbitrator ruled that since neither party had provided effective written
notice of termination, the contract was automatically renewed. Id.
166. Id. The district court concluded that the contract termination question clearly
involved an interpretation of the duration clause, and was therefore arbitrable. Id.
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unduly broad.117 The company advanced several alternative theories in
support of its argument that the contract had terminated, but only one
of these theories was based directly on the contract.""8 The Second Cir-
cuit held that the district court had wrongfully abrogated its obligation
to determine questions of substantive arbitrability when it remanded
to arbitration consideration of all these alternative theories. 6 9 Only the
expiration theory based on the contract was arbitrable, because the ar-
bitration clause of the contract limited the scope of arbitrable griev-
ances to disputes arising "under" the contract. 70 Thus, the matter was
remanded so that the district court could examine the company's other
non-contractual arguments with respect to termination of the contract
and determine whether the dispute was truly arbitrable with respect to
that subject.1
7 '
In the course of its analysis, the Second Circuit had this to say
about Nolde:
In some circumstances the contractual obligation to arbitrate
has been held to survive the termination of the agreement. [In
Nolde] the Supreme Court held arbitrable a claim by the union
that the contract gave employees a vested right to severance
pay, even though the claim was first raised when the employer
discharged the employees after the contract had terminated.
Nolde does not alter the importance of the termination ques-
tion in the present case because the Union's claim here is not
analogous to that asserted in Nolde and because the Nolde ar-
bitration clause extended to 'any' grievance arising between the
167. Id. at 1297. The court noted that the language of the agreement limited arbitra-
tion to disputes arising "under" the contract. Id. The Second Circuit therefore reversed
the order of the district court insofar as it compelled arbitration with respect to issues
not arising "under" the agreement. Id.
168. Id. at 1296. The "contract" theory in support of termination was that the com-
pany had given effective notice to the union, in accordance with the duration clause of
the contract. Id. An additional argument was advanced, however, that the parties had
entered into a "side agreement" to terminate, which was collateral to the contract. Id. at
1296-97. Since the contract contained no provision restricting or prohibiting amend-
ments to its terms, the issue as to whether it had been terminated by collateral agree-
ment was held to be beyond the scope of the arbitration clause. Id. at 1297. The third
theory supporting termination involved the question of "repudiation" by the union. This
issue would be arbitrable upon judicial determination that there had been no collateral
agreement to terminate. Id.
169. Id.
170. See also Gallo Wine Sales of New Jersey v. Wholesale Wine Salesmen's Union,
511 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (issue of whether a contract had expired pursuant to
its terms was arbitrable after alleged expiration).
171. 605 F.2d at 1297. See supra note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the company's non-contractual arguments.
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parties, . . . and was not limited to those arising 'under' the
agreement.
172
Thus, it appears that the Second Circuit may not be inclined to give so
broad and generalized an interpretation to Nolde as has been given by
others.'73 In the Second Circuit, the claim asserted by the union must
be in some sense "analogous" to that asserted in Nolde,174 and the ter-
minology of the arbitration clause with respect to scope may also be
pertinent to the outcome. 75 While the Second Circuit has not thus ex-
plicitly embraced the "accrual" distinction urged by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, this distinction may be implicit in the court's brief discussion of
Nolde in Rochdale.'"8
172. 605 F.2d at 1295 n.6 (citations omitted).
173. See, e.g., American Sink Top & Cabinet Co., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979) (all
grievances arbitrable after termination if "arguably" arising under the contract and con-
tract did not expressly state that duty to arbitrate terminated with expiration of con-
tract), discussed supra text accompanying notes 82-96.
174. 605 F.2d at 1295 n.6. The court noted that the dispute in Nolde involved a claim
to severance pay alleged to have accrued under the expired contract. Id. The dispute in
Rochdale Village, on the other hand, involved the subcontracting of bargaining-unit
work after the alleged expiration of the contract. This claim, the court concluded, was
not analogous to that asserted in Nolde since it did not involve rights alleged to have
accrued under the expired contract. Id. Therefore, the dispute was not subject to arbitra-
tion. Id. at 1297. The court noted, however, that the union had also asserted that the
contract had not expired on the alleged termination date, and therefore, the employer
violated the agreement by subcontracting bargaining unit work during the term of the
contract. Id. at 1294. The question of contract termination, the court concluded, was a
dispute "arising under the agreement," and was therefore arbitrable. Id. at 1295-96,
1297.
175. Id. at 1295. In Nolde, the arbitration clause provided that "any grievance" aris-
ing between the parties was subject to arbitration. 430 U.S. at 245. The language of the
Rochdale agreement, however, limited the duty to arbitrate to disputes arising "under"
the contract. 605 F.2d at 1296.
176. 605 F.2d at 1296. Some later Second Circuit decisions, while not dealing with the
question directly, appear to provide support for this view of the Second Circuit's slowly
emerging interpretation of Nolde. In Diamond Glass Corp. v. Glass Warehouse Workers,
682 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982), the court upheld the district court's refusal to compel post-
contractual arbitration where the union failed to allege any connection between the
grievance and the expired contract. Id. at 303-04. The court commented that the union's
arbitration demand "revealed no details suggesting that the events complained of had
occurred during the term of the expired agreement. Nor did it state that the dispute
related to any right arising under the expired agreement." Id. In Ottley v. Sheepshead
Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1982), a majority of the appeals court panel held
that a disputed contract was still in effect at the time of a contested discharge and, thus,
the discharge was arbitrable. Id. at 889-90. Citing, inter alia, Nolde and Rochdale, dis-
senting Judge Lumbard, who found that the contract was no longer in effect, stated:
I would hold that the duty to arbitrate survives termination of a contract only as
to rights vesting or grievances which had occurred before the contract was termi-
nated. The Supreme Court in Nolde Bros., . . . relied heavily on the fact that
the union sought to arbitrate vested rights. Our decisions go no further.
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In General Warehousemen Local 636 v. J.C. Penney Co.,177 the
court was confronted with an arbitration clause which clearly met the
test set forth by the Supreme Court in Nolde for finding that the par-
ties had limited their arbitration agreement to the term of the con-
tract.17 8 The union was seeking an order to compel arbitration of a dis-
charge which occurred after the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement. 7 9 The parties had agreed that the terms and conditions of
the agreement would continue during the hiatus period, and the court
wrestled with the question whether such an agreement necessarily in-
cluded the obligation to arbitrate discharges. 80 It finally concluded,
based partly on an analysis of the Board's Hilton-Davis decision,'8 '
that such an agreement could not be construed to continue the obliga-
tion to arbitrate in the absence of an express agreement to that ef-
fect.8 2 The court on its own initiative raised the question whether
Id. at 897 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). In Glover Bottled Gas Corp. v. Teamsters Local 282,
711 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1983), the court held arbitrable discharges based on events which
occurred a few days prior to the expiration of the contract, even though discharge notices
were not received by the employees until a few days after. However, the court is not clear
as to whether it is changing course in its development of the Nolde doctrine in this case.
See also District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n v. Puerto Rico Marine Manage-
ment, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 813, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (claims relating to post-contractual
discharge not arbitrable). The Ninth Circuit has similarly limited the scope of post-con-
tractual arbitrability in O'Connor Co., Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1408, 702 F.2d 824 (9th
Cir. 1983).
177. 484 F. Supp. 130 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
178. Id. at 132 n.1. The Nolde test required some indication that the parties intended
their arbitration duties to terminate automatically with the contract in order to over-
come a presumption to the contrary. 430 U.S. at 253. The provision in the General
Warehousemen contract, which expressly limited arbitration to disputes arising "under
and during the term of the Agreement," 484 F. Supp. at 137-38 (emphasis added), satis-
fied the Nolde test.
179. 484 F. Supp. at 132-33.
180. Id. at 133. The company argued that while having agreed to extend the "terms
and conditions of employment" until a new contract was reached, there was no agree-
ment to extend the arbitration provision. Id.
181. 185 N.L.R.B. 241 (1970).
182. 484 F. Supp. at 132 n.1. In General Warehousemen, the contract provided for a
four-step grievance procedure, culminating in binding arbitration. Id. Pursuant to
Hilton-Davis, the court distinguished between grievance procedures and arbitration pro-
visions: whereas an employer may not unilaterally terminate employee grievance proce-
dures during the post-contract hiatus, arbitration provisions may be unilaterally termi-
nated at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 135. The court
concluded that the company's offer to maintain "terms and conditions of employment"
would apply to the grievance procedures, under Hilton-Davis, but could not be reasona-
bly interpreted as an offer to maintain all terms and conditions of the contract, including
the arbitration provision. Id. at 135, 137. In addition, the court noted that as the union
had refused to give up the right to strike during the hiatus period, there was no quid pro
quo for a continued obligation to arbitrate. Id. at 137.
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Nolde applied. 183 It is obvious why the union had not raised Nolde in
its argument to the court-the arbitration provision in the expired
contract specifically stated that a grievance was defined as a dispute or
complaint arising "under and during the term" of the agreement.",
The court concluded that this language met the Nolde test for over-
coming the presumption that the parties intended the arbitration duty
to survive the contract.8 5
In United Mine Workers v. Jericol Mining, Inc.,'8 the issue was
raised whether a union might forfeit its right to pursue arbitration
under a Nolde theory if it did not file its claim within a reasonable
time after the expiration of the contract.18 7 The union in Jericol Min-
ing was seeking arbitration of a claim for vacation pay earned during
the term of an expired contract."8 Even though the contract had ex-
pired the previous December and a strike was then ongoing, the union
filed its claim in June because the normal time for vacations had al-
ways been in June under the expired contract. 189 When the company
refused to pay the strikers vacation pay for time worked between June
of the previous year and the December expiration date of the contract,
the union brought suit to compel arbitration.2
9 0
The court held that Nolde clearly applied to the merits of the case
since the union was seeking benefits which had arguably accrued under
the expired contract."' The company argued, however, that the union's
claim was not advanced within a "reasonable time after the contract's
expiration," as "required" by the Nolde decision.' 9' The court held
that as the practice of the parties had always been for vacation pay to
be paid in June, the union could not be charged with failing to antici-
pate that the company would refuse to pay in June that which had
been earned by employees prior to the strike. 9 3 Consequently, the
claim for pay was asserted in a timely fashion, and the demand for
183. Id. at 137.
184. Id. at 138.
185. Id. See supra note 178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Nolde test
for overcoming the presumption that the parties intended the arbitration duty to survive
the contract.
186. 492 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
187. Id. at 135.
188. Id. at 133.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 134-35. The union was claiming vacation pay benefits which allegedly ac-
crued during the term and under a provision of the expired agreement. Id. at 134.
192. Id. at 135. The Nolde majority acknowledged the issue, yet refrained from spec-
ulation as to the arbitrability of post-termination contractual claims not asserted within
a reasonable time after the contract's expiration. 430 U.S. at 255 n.8.
193. 492 F. Supp. at 135.
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arbitration was made immediately after the claim was denied.194
Therefore, the timeliness requirement, found by the court to be part of
the requirements of Nolde, was met.195
It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Nolde specifically
reserved the question whether timeliness was a factor with respect to
arbitrability of post-contractual grievances. s' Thus, the Jericol Mining
court's holding that the duty to arbitrate "would not apply to a situa-
tion in which a post-termination claim was 'not asserted within a rea-
sonable time' ,,197 is characteristic of the careless way in which Nolde
has occasionally been misconstrued by some lower federal courts and
the Board.
The question whether a union strike undermines the right to arbi-
tration under Nolde was first considered by a court in United Steel-
workers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting. s98 The union in Fort Pitt was seek-
ing to compel arbitration over a series of disputes arising from a plant
closing which took place during an economic strike which followed the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.'99 The disputes con-
cerned various benefits which the union alleged were due the employ-
ees who were laid off in the plant closing, including severance pay, va-
cation pay, life insurance for retirees, deductions of social security
payments from pensions, and unemployment benefit claims under the
expired contract. 00 The court held that all of these questions were ar-
bitrable pursuant to Nolde, despite various contractual arguments ad-
vanced by the company seeking to show that certain phrases used in
the contract indicated an intent to restrict arbitration to the contract's
term. 20 The company also argued, however, that the continuing strike
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 430 U.S. at 255 n.8. The Court stated:
Certiorari was neither sought, nor granted, on the question of the arbitra-
tor's authority to consider arbitrability following referral, and we express no
view on that matter. Similarly, we need not speculate as to the arbitrability of
post-termination contractual claims which, unlike the one presently before us,
are not asserted within a reasonable time after the contract's expiration.
Id. (emphasis added).
197. 492 F. Supp. at 135 (quoting Nolde, 430 U.S. at 255 n.8).
198. 635 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981). For a history of
the labor dispute in this case, see United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598
F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1979).
199. 635 F.2d at 1074.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1081. The company based its argument on (1) the contractual definition of
"employee" as specified workers represented by the union "during the life of this Agree-
ment;" (2) the fact that the agreement restricted filing of grievances to "employees" as
defined above; and (3) the fact that a provision of the contract stated that grievances
which arose prior to the agreement's commencement were arbitrable under its terms,
thus showing that the parties by negative implication would have to agree on such a
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by the union should have prevented any order to arbitrate, because the
no-strike clause of the expired agreement was the quid pro quo for the
arbitration clause.20 2 How could the company be compelled to arbitrate
over grievances at a time when the union was on strike? The court
rejected this argument, holding that an economic strike over new con-
tract terms did not violate the no-strike clause, which was only in-
tended to bar strikes over arbitrable disputes concerning interpreta-
tion of the prior contract's terms.203 The court observed that the quid
pro quo theory rested on a notion of coterminous interpretation 20 4 -a
no-strike obligation extends to the same subjects as the arbitration
clause to which it is linked.205 Thus, unless the parties had agreed that
new contract terms would be subject to arbitration, the no-strike
clause would not prohibit a strike over new contract terms.2 1' Because
the arbitration clause in Fort Pitt's contract applied only to contract
interpretation grievances, the strike over new terms did not involve an
arbitrable dispute and thus did not violate the no-strike clause. Conse-
quently, the strike was no bar to arbitration of the grievances. 20 7
In Federated Metals Corp. v. United Steelworkers,20 8 the Third
Circuit took Nolde a step further along the road to finding virtually
every post-contractual dispute arbitrable. In Federated Metals, a
union struck for a new contract upon the expiration of the old one.209
After six months of the strike, during which time bargaining continued,
the company determined to close down its plant.210 Several months
later, various pension benefit claims were filed by employees who had
provision in their next contract in order to render any grievances arbitrable which re-
lated back to the previous contract. The court found that none of these examples rose to
the level of a "clear implication" that the parties meant to cut off arbitrability with the
expiration of their contract. Id. at 1075-76.
202. Id. at 1076.
203. Id. at 1076-78.
204. Id. at 1077.
205. Id. The notion of coterminous interpretation developed in cases where a no-
strike obligation was inferred from the existence of an arbitration clause. See, e.g., Gate-
way Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (strike over a safety issue violated implied
no-strike obligation because safety issues were arbitrable).
206. 635 F.2d at 1076-78.
207. Id. at 1078. The court concluded that:
Fort Pitt and the Union intended that the obligation not to strike or lockout
would be coterminous with the duty to arbitrate, and that the no-strike clause
would have no application to the use of economic weapons in support of either
party's bargaining position.... We conclude that the Union's strike, which was
not over the grievances it seeks to arbitrate, does not alter Fort Pitt's obligation
to arbitrate the grievances that arose after termination of the Agreement.
Id.
208. 648 F.2d 856 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981).




lost their jobs as a result of the plant closing.2 11 Several employees
were denied benefits on the grounds of insufficient length of service.
212
These employees contended that all time up to the closing of the plant
should have been counted, while the company claimed that upon the
expiration of the contract and commencement of the strike, the indi-
viduals had stopped accruing service time.2 13 The union requested arbi-
tration over the question whether time had continued to accrue during
the strike until the plant closing.2 4 The company refused to arbitrate
and filed a complaint in federal district court to stay the arbitration.21 5
In response, the union moved for an order compelling arbitration.
21 6
The district court agreed with the union and ordered arbitration, hold-
ing that the dispute arose under the expired agreement, even though it
arose after the agreement had expired, and that the union had not
delayed unreasonably in filing its grievance.
21 7
Federated Metals presented several significant issues for the
Third Circuit. It was an "accrual" case with a twist, in that the union
was arguing for accrual of benefits after the contract had expired and
while the employees were on strike.218 Furthermore, it was a case where
the claim was asserted almost a year after the contract expired, and
many months after the plant closed, thus raising questions of
timeliness.
2 9
211. Id. The pension benefits sought were "70/80" benefits. This pension plan pro-
vided for early retirement if an employee was 55 years old and his age combined with his
years of continuous service service with the company totaled 70 years; or if he was under
55 years old and his age and continuous service totaled 80 years. Id. Several claims for
disability were also made. Id. at 857-58.





217. Federated Metals Corp. v. United Steelworkers, Nos. 80-1606, 80-1607 (D. N.J.
Jan. 23, 1980) (ordering arbitration of pension claims and denying arbitration of the dis-
ability claims). The district court ordered arbitration on the pension claims but denied
the union's request for arbitration on the disability claims. The pension claim was held
to relate to the number of years of service, a subject which was arbitrable under the
Pension and Disability Agreement, while the disability claim did not relate to any sub-
ject arbitrable under that agreement. 648 F.2d at 858. See infra note 224 for the text of
the arbitration clause in the instant case.
218. 648 F.2d at 859-60. This is to be distinguished from the usual accrual case where
the benefits have accrued during the life of the contract. See, e.g., Nolde Bros., Inc. v.
Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977). The union
and Federated Metals disagreed over whether the time after the termination of the
agreement should be included when calculating the continuous service of employees for
purposes of pension and disability benefits. The court viewed this dispute as one "over
the number of years of continuous service" and thus arbitrable under the Pension and
Disability Agreement. 648 F.2d at 860.
219. See infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
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Before the Third Circuit, the company argued that Nolde dealt
only with a situation where benefits accrued while the contract was in
effect.220 The company emphasized the Fourth Circuit's language in
Nolde, expressly limiting its holding in that regard.221 The Third Cir-
cuit, however, rejected this characterization of Nolde, finding instead
that the controlling issue was whether the dispute would ultimately be
resolved by construing the expired contract.222 The court proceeded to
brand as "esoteric" the argument that arbitrability should depend
upon whether a benefit has "vested" or "accrued" at a certain time,
noting that the parties might have agreed in their contract that a par-
ticular benefit would accrue after the termination of the contract.
223
Since the disputed issue was within the scope of the arbitration
clause,224 and involved an interpretation of the contract, 225 and there
was no express provision or clear implication that the arbitration
clause was to terminate with the contract, then the dispute remained
arbitrable even though it arose after the expiration of the contract.220
The company in Federated Metals also argued that the significant
220. Id. at 860-61.
221. Id. at 861. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for the Fourth Circuit's
language in Nolde.
222. 648 F.2d at 861. The court stated:
[The Nolde Court] found it significant that both the union's claim for the bene-
fits and the company's refusal to pay them were based on differing perceptions
of the expired collective bargaining agreement .... The Court reasoned that "it
is clear that, whatever the outcome, the resolution of the claim hinges on the
interpretation ultimately given the contract clause providing for severance pay.
The dispute, therefore, although arising after the expiration of the collective-
bargaining contract, clearly arises under the contract."
Id. (quoting Nolde, 430 U.S. at 249) (emphasis in original).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 860. The arbitration clause of the Pension and Disability Agreement pro-
vided in pertinent part:
If any difference shall arise between any employee.., and the Company as to:
(a) the number of years of continuous service of an employee;
(b) the age of such employee; or
(c) whether permanent and total disability did or did not result from the cause
listed ... ,
the question may be submitted by either party for arbitration to the American
Arbitration Association.
Id. at 858 n.5. The court concluded that "this dispute is over the number of years of
continuous service" and is therefore "one of the three issues subject to arbitration." Id.
at 860.
225. Id. at 861. The Pension and Disability Agreement had to be interpreted to de-
termine whether employees continued to accumulate service credit time after the expira-
tion of the agreement, as the union claimed, or whether the termination of the agreement
constituted a break, whereby service credit time would no longer accrue, as the company
contended. Id. at 861-62.
226. Id. at 862.
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lapse of time before presentation of the grievances violated the princi-
ple "alluded to" in Nolde that grievances must be presented within a
reasonable time.227 The court disagreed, construing such reasonable
time "requirement" to mean that the union could not unreasonably
delay in presenting its grievances for arbitration once they had
arisen. 22s In the instant case, the grievances did not arise until the
company denied claims for pension benefits filed several months after
the plant had closed, and the union filed its demand for arbitration
promptly after such denial.229 The court noted the parallel to its prior
holding in Fort Pitt,230 where the court had held that there was no
unreasonable delay when, through no fault of the union, the grievance
itself did not arise until well after the expiration of the contract.
28 1
This review of the federal case law on post-contractual arbi-
trability under the Nolde decision illustrates how the Supreme Court's
supposedly definitive ruling has left many questions unanswered, due
at least in part to the Court's ambiguously worded decision which was
unclear as to the basis for its finding of arbitrability.232 If the Nolde
grievance remained arbitrable (even though it arose after contract ex-
227. Id. In Federated Metals, the pension claims were filed nine months after the
contracts expired and three months after the public announcement to close the plant.
The union filed a request for arbitration after the claims were denied by the employer.
Id. at 857-58. Federated Metals contended that arbitration should not be required be-
cause the union's claims were not asserted "within a reasonable time after the agreement
had expired." Id. at 859 (citing Nolde, 430 U.S. 243 (1977)).
228. Id. at 862. The court stated: "Although there may be some situations in which so
much time has elapsed since the contract expired that to order arbitration would be
unfair despite the fact that the union has not delayed unreasonably, we do not believe
that this is such a case." Id. The court thus rejected the company's argument that the
"reasonable time" principle referred to the actual time elapsed since the termination of
the contract. The critical inquiry, the court noted, was whether the union had delayed
unreasonably in its demand for arbitration once the dispute had arisen. Id.
229. Id. at 857-58.
230. United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 635 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981).
231. 648 F.2d at 862. For a discussion of Fort Pitt, see supra notes 198-207 and ac-
companying text. The Fort Pitt court noted that the grievances did not arise until after
Fort Pitt had closed the plant and asserted that it had no obligation to comply with the
arbitration provision. Since the union did not delay unreasonably in asserting its claim
for arbitration, the length of time between the termination of the contract and the de-
mand for arbitration did not absolve Fort Pitt of its duty to arbitrate the grievances. 635
F.2d at 1078.
The Federated Metals court noted that the two cases were gimilar in that both in-
volved grievances that arose while the parties were negotiating for a new agreement after
the old agreement had expired. 648 F.2d at 862. In such cases the court felt the proper
inquiry was whether the union had delayed unreasonably in asserting the disputed claim,
not whether an unreasonable time had elapsed since the expiration of the old contract.
Id.
232. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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piration) because it involved a claim for benefits which arguably ac-
crued or were earned during the term of the expired contract, 33 then
those decisions finding arbitrable post-contractual discharges or claims
for benefits earned after contract termination, are probably wrong.234
If, on the other hand, the underlying rationale of the Supreme Court's
decision is that the parties must be presumed to intend that arbi-
trability survives contract expiration, without regard to the nature of
the grievance, unless the contract expressly or by clear implication lim-
its post-contractual arbitrability, 35 then those decisions finding arbi-
trable post-contractual disputes which do not fit within the accrual
theory are correct.23
6
The Supreme Court's opinion by itself is too ambiguous to resolve
this fundamental disagreement. The policy considerations cited by the
Court,2 37 however, seem to support the "accrual" theory better than
the "presumption of continuing arbitrability" theory. Thus, while the
Court, in support of the "presumption theory," notes the fact that the
parties negotiated within the context of a national labor policy which
encourages arbitration and presumes arbitrability in doubtful cases, 236
at the same time, the parties were not conducting negotiations in a
context where a court had already articulated the idea that arbitration
clauses had to be expressly self-limiting in order to expire with the
contract. Indeed, the Hilton-Davis decision would have led negotiating
parties to believe exactly the opposite, i.e., that the arbitration duty
would always expire with the contract unless it was expressly extended
by agreement of the parties.3 9 Parties negotiating in the context of
pre-Nolde case law could not have been expected to know what the
233. This is the interpretation suggested by the Fourth Circuit in its Nolde decision,
530 F.2d at 552, discussed supra note 43 and accompanying text, and the Second Circuit
in Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Serv. Employees Union, 605 F.2d at 1296, discussed
supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Federated Metals Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 648 F.2d 856 (3d Cir.
1981) (dispute over pension benefit claims was arbitrable even though the claims arose
after the expiration of the contract); Local 589, ILGWU v. Kellwood Co., 592 F.2d 1008
(8th Cir. 1979) (dispute over pension payments was arbitrable regardless of when the
claim arose since the pension rights were created by the expired contract).
235. See General Warehousemen Local 636 v. J.C. Penney Co., 484 F. Supp. 130
(W.D. Pa. 1980) (contract language held to overcome the presumption that the parties
intended the duty to arbitrate to survive the contract). See also Federated Metals Corp.
v. United Steelworkers, 648 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1981) (narrow arbitration clause held not
to demonstrate parties' intent to have clause terminate with the contract).
236. See cases cited supra note 234.
237. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
238. 430 U.S. at 254-55.
239. For a discussion of Hilton-Davis, see supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
The Hilton-Davis Board had held that since the duty to arbitrate was a creation of con-
tract, the duty would expire with the contract. 185 N.L.R.B. at 242.
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Court in Nolde says they were presumed to know! 240 Furthermore, the
Court's statement that the parties' agreement to arbitrate grievances
demonstrates their special confidence in the ability of an arbitrator to
resolve their disputes during the term of an agreement 24' bears little
relationship to the question whether they wanted post-contractual dis-
putes to be arbitrable. Once a contract has expired, the intricate
"package" of rights and responsibilities which it represents, among
which the grievance arbitration clause is merely one factor, no longer
pertains. The employer's agreement that arbitration is a preferable
mechanism for resolving contractual disputes may be based on an un-
derstanding of that total "package" and its functioning which does not,
in whole or in part, treat the question whether the employer would
have agreed to arbitration in the absence of some or all of the rest of
the "package." Thus, it should not be presumed that the parties, by
agreeing to arbitration as part of the "package," wished their disputes
to remain arbitrable after contract termination merely because they
preferred an arbitrator to a judge as their decision-maker during the
contract term. This is a presumption which clearly underlies the
Court's resort to quotations from the Steelworker's Trilogy about the
preference for arbitrators as dispute settlers. 4 2 Parties may just as rea-
240. The Nolde Court stated that the parties must have been conscious of the federal
labor policy favoring arbitration to resolve labor disputes and the Court's use of a strong
presumption favoring arbitration to effectuate the policy. 430 U.S. at 254-55. The Court
cited Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), as support for
the presumption of arbitrability as well as the presumption of knowledge of this policy
on behalf of the parties. 430 U.S. at 254-55.
241. Id. at 253-54.
242. Id. The Court stated:
By their contract the parties clearly expressed their preference for an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, interpretation of their obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement. Their reasons for doing so, as well as the special role of
arbitration in the employer-employee relationship, have long been recognized by
this Court:
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in
his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal
judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the con-
tract as criteria for judgment .... The ablest judge cannot be expected to
bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of
a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed. [United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)].
Indeed, it is because of his special experience, expertise, and selection by the
parties that courts generally defer to an arbitrator's interpretation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement:
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a
question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bar-
gained for and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the
contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpreta-
tion of the contract is different from his. [United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
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sonably be presumed to intend that post-contractual grievances, in
common with all labor-management disputes, will be subject to resolu-
tion according to the relative economic strengths of the parties, as is
the case in the absence of a contractual arbitration mechanism. 243 Why
is there presumed an intention that arbitrability will continue, when
the parties have agreed to a provision for termination of the contract?
It would be more rational to presume that where a contract has a ter-
mination provision, the parties intended to terminate all aspects of the
agreement, unless the agreement contains language expressly negating
this presumption as to a particular provision.
Given the faulty policy support for the "continuing presumption"
interpretation of Nolde, a sounder basis for the Supreme Court's find-
ing of arbitrability is the "accrual" theory which was suggested by the
Fourth Circuit2 4 and apparently concurred in by the Second Circuit.2 45
Thus, the problem for a district court in deciding a post-contractual
arbitrability case is one of conceptualizing the claim presented for arbi-
tration. If the grievance claim involves an issue which the contracting
parties apparently intended to be covered by their expired agreement,
such as a claim for benefits earned during the term of the agreement,
or a claim that a provision of the agreement continued in effect beyond
the agreement's termination, then the claim would remain arbitrable,
even though it was presented for arbitration after the agreement had
expired. 246 On the other hand, if the claim raised by the grieving party
involves only post-contractual issues, such as a post-contractual dis-
charge which has no factual "relation back" to events prior to the con-
tract's expiration, then the dispute would not be arbitrable.247 Of cru-
cial significance in this analysis is the question of when the operative
facts underlying the grievance occurred, not when the grievance itself
arose.
Thus, in the Nolde case, although the grievance arose after the
contract expired, 248 the operative facts predated contract expiration 249
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)].
430 U.S. at 253-54.
243. See, e.g., 430 U.S. at 255 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
244. 530 F.2d at 552. See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Fourth Circuit's "accrual theory" under Nolde.
245. See Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Serv. Employees Union, 605 F.2d 1290 (2d
Cir. 1979), discussed supra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers
Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977) (dispute over amount of severance pay benefits earned during
term of contract found to be arbitrable).
247. See, e.g., Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc.,
444 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (employer had no duty to arbitrate post-contractual
discharge where union failed to allege that grievance arose under expired contract), dis-
cussed supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
248. 430 U.S. at 247. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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and so an interpretation of the expired contract was clearly called for.
In addition, it was not unreasonable to assume that the parties, having
agreed at the commencement of their contract to include an arbitration
provision to govern contract interpretation disputes, intended that dis-
putes over the meaning of the severance provision would be arbitrable,
even though such disputes might have arisen after the contract (and
the severance provision) had expired.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem of determining whether a claim arising after the ter-
mination of a contract is arbitrable is really a problem of conceptual-
ization, and the difficulty in applying the Nolde decision arises because
the Supreme Court did not address the problem with sufficient concep-
tual clarity.2 10 Furthermore, the rather different analysis suggested
herein for deciding cases in the Labor Board forum under section
8(a)(5), as opposed to the judicial forum under section 301, provides a
further instance of the need for conceptual clarity. Thus, the Board's
decision in American Sink Top seems inappropriate from a policy per-
spective because the Board did not clearly articulate a rationale consis-
tent with the mode of analysis usually applied in cases involving uni-
lateral changes of terms of an expired contract.
51
Where it is charged that section 8(a)(5) has been violated by a
refusal to arbitrate a post-contractual grievance, the Board should ap-
ply the mode of analysis normally applied in cases where an unlawful
unilateral change of an employment condition is alleged.2 52 Because the
question of grievance arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing,2 53 the parties may not abrogate the arbitration requirement of
their expired contract until an impasse in bargaining has occurred.2 "
Prior to impasse, the failure to arbitrate any grievance which would
have been subject to the grievance arbitration procedure had it arisen
249. Id. at 244-47. According to the contract, an individual's severance pay was in
part determined by his length of employment. Thus employees working during the term
of the contract arguably accrued severance benefit rights during that time. Id. at 245 n.2.
250. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text. See also supra note 3 and ac-
companying text.
251. 242 N.L.R.B. at 408. Instead, the Board stated that the employer was required
to arbitrate the discharge grievance since it "arguably" arose under the expired contract.
Id. This analysis is appropriate in a § 301 action but a different approach is necessary in
a § 8(a)(5) action. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55.
252. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969) (unilateral change
in term or condition of employment by employer is a violation of § 8(a)(5)), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 965, reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 1059 (1970).
253. See NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 583 (9th Cir. 1980); Chicago
Magnesium Castings Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 1028, 1034 (7th Cir. 1980).
254. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 747 (1962).
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during the contract term, will constitute a refusal to bargain in good
faith, regardless of whether the grievance itself is conceptualized as an
"accrual case."2 55 In the same manner, if it is charged that a party has
refused to arbitrate a grievance which arose after a bargaining impasse
had occurred, there will be no unlawful refusal to bargain, because
once the impasse has occurred, the parties (in this instance, usually the
employer) are free to implement terms less favorable than those of-
fered at the negotiation table,25 and so an employer may suspend the
arbitration process, again regardless of whether the grievance can be
conceptualized as an "accrual case." This mode of analysis provides a
consistent, clearly defined rule by which employers and unions should
be able to resolve with reasonable certainty the question of whether
their statutory bargaining duty obliges them to submit particular post-
contractual grievances to arbitration. Viewed in this light, it can be
seen that American Sink Top,257 as a result of faulty conceptualization,
represents a misapplication of the Nolde case-the question presented
in Nolde was purely one of contract interpretation, not of the statutory
duty to bargain.2 8 Thus, the Nolde result really had no bearing on the
question before the Board in American Sink Top.
259
In cases arising under section 301, where a party claims that a
grievance is arbitrable although it arose after the expiration of the per-
tinent collective bargaining agreement, a different conceptual problem
is presented to the court-the question whether, as a matter of con-
tract construction, the particular grievance in issue remains subject to
arbitration because it requires an interpretation of the expired con-
tract.2 0 It is here that the conceptual fuzziness of the Supreme Court's
255. See generally Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
Cir. 1981).
256. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741 (1962).
257. 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979).
258. 430 U.S. at 244. The Court stated that the issue was "whether a party to a col-
lective-bargaining contract may be required to arbitrate a contractual dispute over sever-
ance pay pursuant to the arbitration clause of that agreement ... " Id. (emphasis
added).
259. This is not to say that the result in American Sink Top is wrong. Under this
analysis, the Board should have determined whether the negotiations had reached an
impasse and not whether the dispute was "arguably" based upon a contract that did not
expressly provide for the expiration of the arbitration provision upon contract termina-
tion. Assuming that no impasse had occurred at the time the discharge grievance was
filed, the Board's decision that the grievance was arbitrable would be correct. Only if an
impasse had been reached would the employer have been free to suspend the arbitration
process under § 8(a)(5).
260. The importance of the interpretation requirement is evidenced by the Court's
statement in Nolde: "However, it is clear that, whatever the outcome, the resolution of
that claim hinges on the interpretation ultimately given the contract clause providing for
severance pay." 430 U.S. at 249. See also Federated Metals Corp. v. United Steelworkers,
648 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1981). The Federated Metals court stated: "The dispute here, like
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Nolde decision causes trouble.28 1 The Supreme Court appears, at one
point in its opinion, to limit the question of contract construction to
interpretation of the grievance arbitration provision, without regard to
the nature of the grievance.26 2 Applying a presumption that the parties
intended all grievances to remain arbitrable after contract expiration
unless they specified otherwise, the Court would apparently look solely
at the arbitration provision language and, if it found no express or
clearly implied intention to limit the arbitration duty temporally, the
Court would hold the post-contractual dispute to be arbitrable.286 Else-
where in its opinion, however, the Court analyzed the nature of the
grievance itself,2 ' and found significant a conceptualization of the
Nolde grievance requiring an authoritative substantive construction of
the expired contract, regardless of the time when the claim arose, be-
cause the claim related to benefits alleged to have been earned while
the contract was in effect.
28 5
Clearly, the Court's two modes of contract analysis cannot be con-
sidered in isolation from each other if a sensible rule is to emerge. Con-
sistent with the fundamental policy expression, reiterated by the Nolde
Court, that the duty to arbitrate is a duty created entirely by con-
tract,28 8 it appears most reasonable to use a mode of analysis that looks
for a positive indication in the contract that a particular grievance is,
at least arguably, subject to arbitration, rather than a mode of analysis
that assumes all grievances to be arbitrable unless clearly or impliedly
rendered non-arbitrable by the contract. Consequently, it is clear that
the conceptualization of the grievance-its classification as involving
either issues of "accrual of benefits" during the contract's term or
other issues requiring a construction ;f the expired contract's
that in Nolde, turns on differing interpretations of the expired Pension and Disability
Agreement...." Id. at 861.
261. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
262. 430 U.S. at 252-55. This is evidenced by the Court's statement that "there is
nothing in the arbitration clause that expressly excludes from its operation a dispute
which arises under the contract, but which is based on events that occur after its termi-
nation." Id. at 253. While the Court noted that the contract's silence did not establish
the parties' intent to have post-termination disputes arbitrated, there were strong policy
considerations to support that conclusion. Id. For a discussion of these policy considera-
tions, see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
263. 430 U.S. at 255. The Court opined: "In short, where the dispute is over a provi-
sion of the expired agreement, the presumptions favoring arbitrability must be negated
expressly or by clear implication." Id.
264. Id. at 248-50.
265. Id. The authoritative substantive construction of the expired contract is re-
quired to determine whether the parties intended the severance pay clause to terminate
with the contract or to allow for the realization of accrued rights after the agreement had
expired. Id. at 249. The resolution of the dispute would therefore depend upon the inter-
pretation given to the severance pay clause. Id.
266. Id. at 250-51.
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terms-is the first step in determining post-contractual arbitrability.
Once the grievance is so conceptualized, it is then appropriate to ex-
amine the expired contract's arbitration provision to determine
whether arbitrability has nonetheless been extinguished by an express
or implied temporal limitation in that provision.6
The result may be that a grievance which is not arbitrable under
this section 301 analysis must be arbitrated prior to a bargaining im-
passe due to the section 8(a)(5) duty to maintain conditions of employ-
ment after contract expiration.2 6 Conversely, the result may be that a
grievance no longer subject to the statutory duty because an impasse in
bargaining has occurred, must nonetheless be arbitrated because it re-
quires an interpretation of the expired contract and there is no lan-
guage in that expired contract expressly or impliedly extinguishing
arbitrability of post-contractual grievances.26 This apparently para-
doxical set of results, however, is not unusual in the field of labor rela-
tions, and employers and unions have learned to deal with such para-
doxes and to consider their courses of action appropriately. 70
Thus, the inconsistent case law developments spawned by Nolde's
conceptual murk271 are really unnecessary, as straightforward applica-
tions of the principles already developed under sections 8(a)(5) and
301 make clear. Perhaps the existing split in circuit authority will lead
the Supreme Court during the 1980's to reconsider this issue in a way
that will provide some needed light to guide unions, employers, the
labor relations bar and authoritative decision-makers on the Labor
Board and on the bench.
'2
267. This examintion of the arbitration provision is required under Nolde since the
parties could limit the arbitration clause in the contract. Id. at 252-53.
268. For a discussion of the arbitrability of disputes under § 8(a)(5), see supra notes
97-115 and accompanying text.
269. This would be consistent with the result in American Sink Top & Cabinet Co.,
242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979). In American Sink Top the Board did not consider whether an
impasse in bargaining had been reached but determined that the dispute was arbitrable
since it "arguably" involved an interpretation of the contract. See supra notes 82-96 and
accompanying text.
270. Thus, for example, an employer may unilaterally modify a contract term dealing
with a non-mandatory subject of bargaining without incurring any § 8(a)(5) liability, but
the employer remains liable to the union for breach of contract under § 301. See Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
For a discussion of Pittsburgh Plate Glass, see supra note 110.
271. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
272. The National Labor Relations Board agrees that the problem of post-contrac-
tual arbitrability requires its attention, having held a rare full-Board oral argument on
December 6, 1983, in a case concerning a refusal to arbitrate post-contractual grievances.
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., NLRB Case No. 25-CA-10549. (See 1983 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 232, Dec. 1, 1983).
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